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SUMMARY
One of the areas most affected by SARS was Beijing with 2521 reported cases. We estimate the
effective reproductive number Rt for the Beijing SARS epidemic, which represents the average
number of secondary cases per primary case on each day of the epidemic and is therefore a
measure of the underlying transmission dynamics. Our results provide a quantitative assessment
of the effectiveness of public health control measures. More generally, our results illustrate how
changes in Rt will reflect changes in the epidemic curve.
The first case of SARS in Beijing was reported on 5
March 2003, and via a series of imported index cases
in the following weeks it became the largest outbreak
of SARS in the world with a total of 2521 reported
probable cases [1] of whom 193 (7.7%) died [2]. Here
we assess the effectiveness of the various control
measures that were implemented in Beijing by esti-
mating the changes in the underlying degree of disease
transmission during the epidemic.
The only published epidemic curve describing dates
of symptom onset of probable SARS cases in Beijing,
rather than dates of hospital admission, is presented
by Liang et al. [3]. The epidemic curve of symptom
onset dates of 1896 patients (75% of the probable
SARS cases in Beijing) is presented in the Figure,
where dates of important control measures [1, 4] are
superimposed. The epidemic curve reveals an ex-
ponential increase in early April, then a steady in-
crease to a peak in late April, followed by a steady
decline throughout May with the final cases occurring
before the end of that month.
Contact tracing and quarantine of close contacts of
probable cases began on 9 April. SARS was made a
notifiable disease and 3500 public health workers were
mobilized on 10 April, while the mayor of Beijing set
up the joint SARS leading group on 17 April. On the
same day, some 123 fever clinics were set up in hos-
pitals across Beijing, while near the end of the epi-
demic on 6 May these were reduced to 66 clinics
separated from other patient areas [1]. From 18 April,
health-care workers were given special training in the
management of patients with SARS, infection con-
trol, and the use of personal protective equipment
(PPE) including masks, goggles and gowns; detailed
infection control guidelines were issued by the China
Ministry of Health on 4 May [1]. The executive vice-
minister of health announced the scope of the Beijing
outbreak in a press conference on 20 April [1], and
this was followed 3 days later by the WHO travel
advisory [4]. After 21 April, there was a rapid increase
in the number of quarantined close contacts of in-
fected cases ; these contacts were primarily quar-
antined at home while some were quarantined in
hotels and university residences, and by the end of the
epidemic a total of 30 000 individuals had been quar-
antined [1]. On 22 April, fever checks were set up at
the Beijing international airport ; screening was also
* Author for correspondence: Dr B. J. Cowling, Department of
Community Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, 21 Sassoon
Road, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, China.
(Email : bcowling@hku.hk)
Epidemiol. Infect. (2008), 136, 562–566. f 2007 Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0950268807008722 Printed in the United Kingdom
conducted at major train stations and main roads into
Beijing [1]. On 24 April all public elementary, middle
and high schools were closed, and on 26 April major
sites of public entertainment including libraries, bars
and theatres were closed [1]. On 27 April SARS pa-
tients in hospitals began to be grouped together on
designated wards, and on 1 May the new 1000-bed
Xiao Tang Shan Hospital opened and began to re-
ceive SARS patients from other hospitals in Beijing,
having been constructed in just 7 days [1].
To investigate the effectiveness of control measures
in reducing the person-to-person transmission of
SARS, we used the method of Wallinga & Teunis [5]
to estimate Rt, the effective reproduction number on
day t which is defined as the average number of sec-
ondary cases generated by one primary case with
symptom onset on day t, and is a useful measure of
the transmission dynamics of a disease [6]. If Rt
exceeds 1, the epidemic will continue to spread,
whereas Rt must be persistently reduced to below 1 to
control an epidemic. Estimation of Rt requires the
daily number of patients with onset of symptoms, and
an estimate of the serial interval between onset of
symptoms in a primary case and a secondary case. No
data were available on the serial interval in Beijing,
thus we used data from Singapore [7] to specify a
Weibull distribution with mean 8.4 days, which was
previously used to estimate Rt during the SARS epi-
demics in Hong Kong, Singapore, Toronto and
Vietnam [5]. We estimated 95% confidence intervals
for Rt on each day (see Appendix).
The resulting daily estimates of Rt are presented in
the Figure. Prior to 23 March, the small number of
cases resulted in unstable estimates of Rt with wide
confidence intervals, thus we only present the esti-
mates of Rt from 24 March onwards. The Figure
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Fig. (a) Number of cases of SARS by date of onset (n=1896) and dates of important control measures, Beijing, March–May
2003 [1, 3, 4]. (b) Daily estimates of the effective reproductive number Rt with 95% confidence intervals where the grey region
indicates Rtf1. HCW, Health-care worker; PPE, personal protective equipment; WHO,World Health Organisation; MOH,
China Ministry of Health.
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shows that Rt initially remained at a constant level of
about 3, before steadily declining after 11 April, fall-
ing to a level below 1 on 23 April, and then declining
more slowly towards 0 throughout May.
The initial estimate of RtB3 early in the Beijing
epidemic is very similar to estimates of the repro-
ductive number early in the epidemics in Hong Kong,
Vietnam, Singapore and Canada [5]. Our finding that
the reproductive number only began to decline in
mid-April, going below the threshold of 1 on 23 April,
suggests that control measures in Beijing were fairly
ineffective for 5 weeks after the first cases. However,
once political attention was given to the outbreak,
evidenced by the initiation of contact tracing on 9
April, and the order for SARS to be notifiable on 10
April, transmission (indicated by Rt) immediately be-
gan to decline. Shortly after the introduction of fever
clinics, and training in use of PPE in hospitals in mid-
April, Rt fell below the critical threshold of 1 (i.e.
under control). Therefore, our results suggest that the
most important factor in the control of SARS in
Beijing as elsewhere was strong political commitment
and a coordinated response. When the government
finally announced on 20 April the scope of the on-
going SARS epidemic, the disease was already almost
under control (Rt was just above 1).
Our estimates of Rt call into question the necessity
and utility of closing schools, universities and other
public places, with its disruptive effects on society.
Furthermore, Rt had subsided to below 0.5 when the
1000-bed Xiao Tang Shan specialist SARS hospital
was constructed, updated infection control guidelines
were issued, and new fever clinics opened in early
May. As our current analysis illustrates, the epidemic
curve will typically continue to rise even after a dis-
ease has been controlled (with Rt<1), with the delay
depending on the incubation period of the disease. In
the Figure, case numbers continue to rise for 4 days
after Rt falls below 1, whereas the mean incubation
period of SARS was about 5 days [8]. We further
observe that while RtB3 prior to 11 April, the epi-
demic curve continued to show exponential increase
through March and early April until 16 April (i.e. a
lag of 5 days).
This example, in addition to earlier examples from
four other sites affected by SARS [5], highlights the
connection between a unimodal epidemic curve and
the underlying Rt ; two properties are worth particular
mention. First, while Rt is constant the curve will
show an exponential increase which will continue for
some time after Rt begins to fall. Second, the peak in
the epidemic curve will occur some time after Rt falls
below 1. In both cases the lag will approximately
equal the mean incubation period. For outbreaks of
infectious diseases with even longer mean incubation
periods than SARS it is clear that it may not be re-
liable to assess the effect of control measures simply
based on patterns in the epidemic curve, without
considering the underlying transmission dynamics.
We note that methods are now available to estimate
Rt in real time [9, 10] and these may allow rapid as-
sessment of the impact of control measures in future
emerging infectious disease epidemics.
Previous assessments of the impact of public health
interventions in Beijing have focused on the epidemic
curve [1, 3], the number of individuals quarantined
[1], attack rates [1], the onset to admission interval [1,
3], and the admission to notification interval [3]. For
example, the onset to admission intervals averaged
around 6 days while the epidemic was growing in
early April, but these were reduced to a median of just
2 days by the end of May [1], whereas the interval
between admission to hospital and notification of
probable SARS cases declined rapidly at the begin-
ning of April, and was below 1 day after 13 April [3].
Our analysis adds to these previous findings by dem-
onstrating the changes in the underlying disease
transmission during the epidemic, and aligning these
changes with the temporal course of the various con-
trol measures.
A caveat of these analyses is that the available data
on symptom onset dates only describe the epidemic
curve for 75% of the SARS patients in Beijing [3].
However, further analysis using data for 2430 (96%)
of the patients in Beijing [1] and imputing missing
data on symptom onset dates showed a very similar
pattern from April onwards (see Appendix and
Appendix Fig.).
APPENDIX
Estimation of confidence intervals for Rt
The methods used to estimate Rt are described in de-
tail elsewhere in the literature [5]. Briefly, for an epi-
demic of n reported cases of which q contracted
infection from outside the population, the relative
likelihood that case k has been infected by case l is
given by
p(k, l)=
w(tkxtl)P
mlk
w(tkxtm)
,
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where w(.) is the generation interval (the average time
between onset of symptoms in a primary case and
onset of symptoms in a secondary case). The onset
times of cases k and l are denoted tk and tl respect-
ively. Note that p(k,l)=0 if tkftl. Assuming that the
probability of case l infecting case m is independent of
the probability of case l infecting any other case, the
distribution of the effective reproduction number for
case l is denoted Rl and is distributed as follows
Rl 
Xnxq
k=1
Bernoulli(p(k, l)):
The average daily reproductive number Rt is calcu-
lated as the arithmetic mean over Rl for all cases l with
symptom onset on day t [5].
When Rt is estimated in this way, it is straight-
forward to calculate the mean and variance as
follows:
x=E(Rt)=
1
nt
X
l:tl=t
Xnxq
k=1
p(k, l),
s2=Var(Rt)=
1
n2t
Xnxq
k=1
X
l:tl=t
p(k, l)(1xp(k, l))

x
X
l,m:tl=tm=t
p(k, l)p(k,m)

:
Then an approximate 95% confidence interval for Rt
is given by x¡1.96s.
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Appendix Fig. (a) Number of cases of SARS by date of onset (n=1896; ——) [3] and by date of admission to hospital
(n=2430; - - -) [1], with 1000 simulated epidemic curves for symptom onset (grey lines) based on the data on admission dates,
Beijing, March–May 2003. (b) Daily estimates of the effective reproductive number Rt with 95% confidence intervals based
on known symptom onset dates [3] as in the text Figure, and the daily estimates of the effective reproductive number Rt in
each of the 1000 simulated epidemic curves (grey lines).
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Supplementary analysis – estimation of Rt by
imputing missing data on onset dates
We conducted a simulation study to test the sensi-
tivity of our results to missing data on the symptom
onset dates of SARS patients in Beijing. Using data
on admission dates [1] which were available for 2430
(96%) patients in Beijing, and data on the onset to
admission intervals during various periods of the
epidemic [3], we simulated the onset dates of those
2430 patients. We conducted 1000 simulations, each
time drawing for each individual a random onset to
admission time from a Poisson distribution with the
mean between 1 and 7 days, depending on the period
[3]. In particular, the mean onset to admission time
was 3 days for patients admitted throughout March, 7
days from 1 to 15 April, 2 days from 15 April to 19
May, and 1 day from 20 May until the end of the
epidemic [3]. The resulting 1000 epidemic curves are
shown in the Appendix Figure [panel (a)], and show
that the majority of missing data in the epidemic
curve of Liang et al. [3] are most likely from the earlier
stages of the epidemic. The Appendix Figure [panel
(b)] also displays the available data on the epidemic
curve by symptom onset dates [3] and by admission
dates [1].
Next, we estimated the effective reproductive num-
ber Rt for each of the 1000 simulated datasets, and
these estimates are presented in the Appendix Figure
[panel (a)]. The estimates of Rt from the primary
analysis are also superimposed for reference. The si-
mulated curves suggest that Rt varied between 2 and 3
during the early stages of the epidemic, and as in the
primary analysis Rt began to decline in the second
week of April, falling below the threshold of 1 around
21 April (2 days earlier than in the main analysis). The
estimated values of Rt in the simulated datasets are
generally lower than in the main analysis, but the
trends are very similar and therefore the conclusions
of the primary analysis do not seem to be affected by
the missing data on symptom onset dates.
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